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1. Introduction 
 
Although a large body of the economic literature has studied the correlation 
between father and son socio-economic status, only fewer and more recent works have 
analysed the differences existing in intergenerational mobility across countries. 
Intergenerational mobility indicators are extremely sensitive to sample selection, thus 
data availability in cross-country comparisons is a crucial issue. Similar information on 
two generations income is needed for each country and both generations should be 
observed working in their prime age. To solve this problem the researchers have been 
looking for similar dataset across country, in order to apply the same selection rules and 
produce comparable estimations.  
A first way to deal the issue is the one undergone by Jantii et al. (2005). They 
compare Nordic countries (register data) to US and UK. They put a lot of effort in 
applying the sample selection design needed to mimic NCDS (The UK cohort study) to 
other national dataset. They find that Nordic countries are mobile societies if compared 
to the US, while the UK showed up to be much closer to Nordic countries than to US. 
Relevant information for the second generation could also be drawn from cross 
section surveys, which are less sensible to sample selection problem than panel data, 
whenever they contain retrospective information on parental background (occupation 
and level of education) for the fathers. This information can be used to construct similar 
indexes of socio-economic positions for both parents and children (Checchi and 
Dardanoni, 2002 and Checchi et al ,1999) or  to infer income from a sample of older 
men (synthetic fathers) and estimate intergenerational correlation using a Two Sample 
Instrumental Variable method (TSIV) (Bjorklund and Jantti ,1997).  
Another and completely different way to solve the data requirement problem in 
intergenerational mobility cross-country comparisons can be found in Couch and Dunn 
(1996). Using two very similar longitudinal data-sets (the GSOEP and the PSID) they 
focus on observations of parents and children contemporaneously active in the labor 
market, apply the same selection rules and same methodology to each country and 
conclude that there is a remarkable similarity between Germany and US. The use of 
contemporaneously working sons and fathers produces estimations that suffer of at least 
two potential biases. Indeed it arises some serious concerns about life-cycle bias 
because sons are observed early in their working career (the average age of sons sample 
is around 25 in US and 22 in Germany) while fathers are observed at later stages (the 
  2average age of fathers sample is around 50). This bias is only partially attenuated by 
controlling for sons and fathers age and age squared. As Haider and Solon (2006) point 
out, the relationship between permanent income and current income varies according to 
the age at which current earnings is measured. They conclude that an under-estimation 
of the true intergenerational mobility elasticity occurs whenever sons are observed in 
their early career and fathers in their late career and this can justify the very low value 
of intergenerational earnings elasticity found by Couch and Dunn (1996). Furthermore, 
concerns arise also in the family matching procedure. As illustrated by Francesconi and 
Nicoletti (2006) the estimation of intergenerational mobility using a short panel may 
arise a selection problem (which they call co-residence selection) because information is 
available only for those child-fathers pairs observed together in at least a wave of the 
panel. They use different selection correction methods, and show that the inverse 
propensity score weighting is the best performer technique and can reduce the sample 
selection bias by more than a half. 
Following Couch and Dunn (1996), in this paper I provide new evidence on 
cross-country comparison of intergenerational earnings elasticity using the same dataset 
for four European countries, the European Community Household Panel. The main 
advantage of these data is that the same “community” questionnaire is adopted by the 
national data collection units in each participating country which increases 
comparability among the countries.  
This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature in two important respects. 
First of all I provide estimates of intergenerational income elasticity for seven European 
countries only partially covered by intergenerational mobility literature up to now. 
These countries are Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Comparable estimations of the intergenerational earnings elasticities exist only for 
France and Germany (Corak, 2006). Secondly, I correct my estimates for co-residence 
selection bias using the propensity score weighting method in order to reduce the bias 
generated by the father-children matching process.  
I am aware that the estimations of intergenerational earnings elasticity may still 
suffer of life-cycle attenuation bias due to the young age of children but, if the 
distortions are similar across countries, then the results can be useful to compare the 
degree of mobility of seven European societies. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I briefly discuss the econometric 
issues related to the measure of earnings intergenerational elasticity, in section 3 I 
  3describe the data and the sample I use and finally section 4 contains the results. Then, 
some concluding remarks are in section 5. 
 
2. Estimation methods 
Earlier studies on intergenerational earnings mobility simply estimate the 
following equation  
Y1i=  Y0i+i         (1) 
where Y1i is a measure of the permanent economic status of the son in family i and Y0i is 
thus the corresponding measure for the father. Following Solon (1992), we can see that 
each generation permanent income is the sum of two components: a permanent one that 
reflects the true long-term earnings capacity (yGi with G=0 for the father and G=1 for 
the child) and a residual one that captures both transitory shocks in a particular year and 
errors due simply to inaccurate report of earnings (vGi with G=0 for the father and G=1 
for the child): 
  YGis= yGi + vGis         ( 2 )  
if we are interested in the relation (1) but we estimate it using single-year measure the 
coefficient will be downward biased by the attenuation factor: 
 






















To reduce this bias Solon (1992) proposes to use an average over many years of 
earnings because this will reduce (but not eliminate completely) the biases generated by 
both transitory shock and measurement error (v0).
1 Mazumder (2003) shows that even 
averaging the fathers’ earnings over five years do not reduce completely errors-in 
variable bias and suggests using more years. Unfortunately only eight waves of ECHP 
have been collected and the best that can be done is to use as many as valid yearly 
earnings available for each observation. 
Parents and children are observed at different points in their life-cycle, thus the 
age effect of parents and children should be controlled simply adding average age and 
average age square of both generations to equation (1). Haider and Solon (2006) and 
Grawe (2006) show that the estimation may be sensitive to life cycle biases even after 
controlling for measurement error and age. Grawe (2006) points out that since income 
                                                 
1 For a discussion see Mazumder (2001) 
  4variance grows over the life cycle, estimates of income persistence based on data from 
mature fathers will naturally be lower than those based on young fathers and finds that 
a great part of the differences in estimated intergenerational correlations for the US is 
explained by the differences in the age of father and sons at the point of measurement. 
Reville (1995) finds that the intergenerational earnings correlation decreases with son’s 
age. Solon and Haider (2006) sum up these results showing that intergenerational 
earnings elasticity estimated on a sample of young sons and old father is subject to 
substantial attenuation inconsistency bias due to both right and left side measurement 
error. This is exactly the case of my estimates and using ECHP I expect to find lower 
levels of intergenerational correlation than other studies (Corak, 2006 for a review), 
because sons are observed in their early life and father in their late years of labour 
market experience.  
Finally, like all the estimations based on short panels, I have to face a co-
residence selection problem. Francesconi and Nicoletti (2006) deeply analyse this 
issues comparing estimates based on the selected samples with those obtained from a 
sample with no selection bias and then test the performance of different approaches to 
correct the bias. They find that the best performer correction method is the inverse 
propensity score weighting method recently used by Woodridge (2002).  
The first step consists on the estimate of the probability to be matched with the 
father in at least a wave: 
xi*=0 + 1Zi+i       (4) 
with   xi=1 if xi*>0 
 xi=0 otherwise 
where xi* is a latent variable with associated dummy variable xi that takes the value 1 
if the father is matched in at least a wave and 0 otherwise. Zi is a vector of 
explanatory variables including years of birth and regional dummies plus some 
identifying restrictions, i.e. variables that affects the probability of being matched and 
not have a direct influence on father income while I is a standard error term. I use 
two indicators of tightness of the house market as identifying restrictions: the rent per 
room and the share of owned houses in the region of residence. From this first stage, I 
compute the inverse propensity score and use it as weight in the main equation. 
Adding father and son age and age squared to equation (1) and taking averages 
over as many years as available for each observation yields: 
   i Y1 = 0 +   i Y0 + 1 A +  i    (6) 
  5where  i Y1 and   i Y0  are the average earnings respectively of sons and father in 
family i, and  A is a vector containing average age and age squared of both father and 
child. 
This is the main equation and it is estimated by weighted least square, using 
inverse propensity score as individual weights. 
If the variance in log earnings is the same for both generations then the 
intergenerational elasticity obtained,  ¸ is also the intergenerational correlation. The 
two measures are roughly comparable even if the variance in income differs 
substantially across generations as shown by Solon (1992). Bowles and Gintis (2002) 
suggest that the regression coefficient is to be preferred since it does not conflate 




3. Data and sample selection 
 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a large household 
survey that covers most member countries in the European Union. Rather than trying 
to harmonise output from national surveys, the European statistical agency (Eurostat) 
adopts an input oriented approach and uses the same community questionnaire as the 
base for the national versions of the survey. A desirable feature of ECHP is that the 
questions on earnings, the reference period and the survey methods are common 
across countries. I use all the available 8 waves, from 1994 to 2001. The survey is 
composed of a household and a personal file, and the same individuals and families 
are followed and interviewed over time. In the first wave (in 1994) a sample of some 
60,500 nationally representative households - i.e. approximately 130,000 adults aged 
16 years and over - were interviewed in the 15 Member States. I provide estimate of 
the intergenerational income elasticities for Germany, Belgium, France, Italy Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. The set of countries considered in this study belongs to 
corporatist-type welfare state
2. This means that the welfare state is family oriented, 
young people tend to cohabit longer with their parents because it can be difficult to 
leave parents’ house and the state does not protect them, for example with 
unemployment benefit if they loose their jobs.  
                                                 
2 The Mediterranean welfare state is considered as a sub-set of the corporatist one. 
  6I consider both son –father and daughter- father pairs and allow families to 
contribute as many father-child pairs as meet the selection rules. Sons and daughters 
are matched to their father using the relational file provided in each wave. So I 
include in the sample every individual that in at least a wave was linked to somebody 
as a child, aged between 16 and 35 and his/her father (i.e. every male that in at least a 
wave was coded as parent and that has an age between 35 and 70). I exclude 
observations during any year in which the child was enrolled in school or the parent 
to whom she is matched was enrolled in school or retired. Finally I exclude both self-
employed and unemployed children and fathers. In calculating averages of earnings 
and age across years, I include as many years of valid data as are available for each 
individual.  
 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
The first concern that arises in selecting the samples is that countries included 
in this paper have different social habits as regards cohabitation with parents and, as 
already seen, this exposes my results to a possible co-residence sample selection bias. 
Table 1 illustrates the undergone selection procedure. In the first two columns the 
number of individuals aged on average less that 35 and more than 17 for each country 
and gender is reported. Using the relational file I then match each child to her father 
and the matched sample size (and the percentage with respect to the initial sample) is 
reported in column 3 and 4. As it can be seen, the percentage of children with an age 
between 17 and 35 matched to their fathers is higher in Mediterranean countries: 
compare the 61% of Italian sons with the 38% of French ones. It should be noticed 
that sons and daughters exhibit different co-residence habits in Italy, Greece and 
Portugal. To account for the existence of two different selection processes among 
children of different gender in different countries, I estimate the selection equation 
separately for each country and child gender. 
Finally only pairs with at least a year of valid earnings information both for 
father and child are included in the sample. The sample sizes drastically decreases. 
Along with the vast majority of studies on intergenerational mobility, I do not explicitly 
correct for selection into employment assuming exogenous selection into employment 
for both generations
3.  
                                                 
3 For a discussion see Couch and Lillard, (1998) and Francesconi e Nicoletti (2006) 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In table 2 I report the average age of children and fathers. Children are observed 
in their early steps in the labour market, and fathers in their last steps. Indeed, the 
average age of the samples does not differ across countries. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Another possible selection problem is due to the exclusion of self-employed 
from the sample. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) study the intergenerational 
persistence of self-employment and finds that the intergenerational link is strong. Self 
–employment reported earnings are far more exposed to measurement error than 
employees’ and the earnings variable I use is the monthly gross salary which is not 
available for self-employed
4 in ECHP. Standard analyses of intergenerational 
mobility exclude self-employed from the sample and assume exogenous selection 
into dependent employment, and I will do the same.  
The earnings variable I use is the current gross monthly earnings. The results are 
thus not affected by differences in national taxation systems. All earnings are then 
converted in 2000 units using ILO current price indexes for each country. Table 3 
contains the average earnings for each sample. In averaging earnings across years, 
missing years of earnings are substituted with the minimum wage in the individual 
history (see Francesconi and Nicoletti, 2006 for a discussion). 
The probability of observing father and children together in at least a wave 
varies among regions within each country and thus I add to the selection equation a set 
of regional dummies
5. Each child is assigned to the region of the first wave she is 
observed if she is not matched with her father, and to the region of her family if she is  
matched. The probability of leaving parental house and not being matched is strongly 
affected by the prevailing condition in the house market (Haurin et al., 1994, Ermisch, 
1999). As proxies of the tightness of house market I compute two different indicators 
for each region. The first one is the average (gross monthly) rent per room of the rented 
houses in the region and the second is the share of owned houses in the region. In order 
                                                 
4 Self employed income is the yearly (not monthly) income of the previous year. 
5  At NUT2 level of definition  in ECHP. 
  8to get a regional representative picture of the house market, in computing these 
indicators I use (yearly) cross-sectional households’ weights. Of course, being these 
indicators computed by region, identification of the effect of house market indicators on 
the probability of being matched is based on the evolution over time of indicators 
among each region. In the selection equation I include also two educational dummies. 
Summary statistics of the main variables included in the selection equation can be found 





Table 4 contains results of the selection equation estimation. For each country 
and gender I estimate the probability to be matched with a father as a function of the 
years of birth (4 years dummies), the (log) of the average rent per room in the region, 
the share of owned houses in the region, two educational dummies (secondary and 
tertiary), and regional dummies. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The house market indicators are statistically significant in all countries and have 
a positive signs: the higher is the rent per room the higher is the likelihood to match 
father and child, the higher the share of owned houses, the lower the share of houses 
available to rent, the higher the probability to observe father and child co-residing. 
Table 5 presents the inverse propensity score weighted least squared estimations 
of equation (6) separately for son-father pairs and daughter-father pairs. 
  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
These coefficients are very low if compared to other results obtained for the 
same countries (see Corak, 2006 for a review) but the few studies that use 
contemporaneous data for fathers and children have results within the same range. 
Couch and Dunn (1996) with a similar structure of data for Germany find results 
between 0.08- 0.28 for sons. 
From table 5 it is possible to conclude that there are significant cross country 
differences within Europe in the degree of intergenerational income mobility and the 
  9transmission process of income from one generation to the other differs according to the 
off-spring gender. In fact, with the exception of Belgium and Greece, the 
intergenerational elasticity is always higher for daughters.  
Excluding those coefficients that are not significant (Greek daughters), I can 
rank countries according to their degree of mobility. As regards son-father pairs, it turns 
out that Mediterranean countries tend to have elasticity above .20 ranging from .196 for 
Spain to .311 for Greece (the most immobile country). Germany seems to be 
characterised by more mobile society whit elasticity around .100. This result confirms 
the ranking found by Corak (2006), according to which Germany with an 
intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE) of .32 was found to be more mobile than 
France (IGE .42).  Belgium is between the two groups, much closer to the 
Mediterranean countries. 
When we consider the rank in intergenerational mobility towards women, a 
completely different picture emerges. Italy is far more immobile than all the other 
countries with an elasticity of .368. At the opposite, Belgium is the more mobile 
society, whit elasticity respectively of .168. All the other countries stay in between.  
The observed heterogeneity in the degree of intergenerational earnings mobility 
among countries begs the question whether these differences can be associated to 
differences in educational system and institutional setups. A reliable analysis could not 
be carried out with this small number of countries, and it is left aside for future works. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper I provide new evidence on cross-country comparison of 
intergenerational mobility using the European Community Household Panel. Although 
this data-set produces estimations that suffer of many potential biases and are non 
directly comparable to other studies using older children, they can still be useful in a 
cross-country comparison point of view.  
For the first time, I ranked seven European countries, only partially covered by 
economic intergenerational mobility literature, according to their degree of income 
intergenerational mobility.  
I confirm that fathers behave differently in passing income and education to 
offspring accordingly to their gender and two different picture emerge when considering 
sons –father and daughters-father pairs.  
  10As regards son-father pairs, it turns out that Mediterranean countries tend to 
have elasticity above .20 ranging from .196 for Spain to .311 for Greece (the most 
immobile country). Germany seems to be characterised by more mobile society whit 
elasticity around .100. Belgium is between the two groups, much closer to the 
Mediterranean countries. When considering the transmission of earnings towards 
daughters, Italy is the most immobile country with elasticity above .3; Belgium is the 
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Table 1: Samples sizes and average age 
Starting sample:  
Matching process: 
Number of matched 
pairs 
(percentage) 
Final samples: pairs 
with valid 
information on 
earnings  Country 
Young male  Young 
female  Sons  Daughter   Sons  Daughter  
Germany   2807  2493  1201 
(43%) 
850 
(34%)  916 673 
Belgium 982  1010  389 
(39%) 
276 
(27%)  235 193 
France 2494  2087  951 
(38%) 
641 
(31%)  683 466 
Italy 2782  2144  1692 
(61%) 
1133 
(53%)  819 528 
Greece 1632  1287  934 
(57%) 
629 
(49%)  402 291 
Spain 3235  2381  1861 
(57%) 
1396 
(59%)  1020 713 
Portugal 2386  1984  1365 
(57%) 
957 






  13Table 2. Average age of the samples 
Average father Age  Average child Age 
Country  Son-father 
pairs 
Daughter-
father pairs Sons Daughters 
Germany  50.1 49.4 22.6 21.6 
Belgium  50.9 49.8 23.7 22.6 
France  49.3 49.4 22.4 22.6 
Italy  53.3 53.2 24.0 23.6 
Greece  52.4 52.3 23.6 22.7 
Spain  52.4 53.0 22.9 23.3 




Table 3. Average monthly gross earnings. 
Average father Earnings  Average children earnings  
Country  Son-father 
pairs 
Daughter-father 
pairs  Sons Daughters 
Germany  2377.5 2313.3 1202.8  922.3 
Belgium  2663.1 2661.0 1658.8 1430.4 
France  2063.1 2193.7 1059.9  985.6 
Italy  1456.3 1581.2 1059.6  924.8 
Greece 932.4  99.5  645.5  546.8 
Spain 1374.8  1507.4  881.0  758.4 
Portugal  655.9 683.7 500.0 455.4 
Note: earnings are expressed in 2000 prices and then converted in euro. 
 








houses in the 
region 
PseudoR2 
Sons  3.41 
(.54) 
10.06 
(.78)  0.32 
Germany 
Daughters  3.35 
(.60) 
9.04 
(.93)  0.36 
Sons  11.06 
(1.69) 
19.28 
(2.44)  0.31 
Belgium 
Daughters  5.78 
(1.61) 
11.94 
(1.89)  0.34 
Sons  7.33 
(0.73) 
18.9 
(1.11)  .34 
France 
Daughters.  7.46 
(.89) 
15.8 
(1.28)  .33 
Sons  3.04 
(.42) 
22.8 
(1.41)  .35 
Italy 
Daughters  1.89 
(.49) 
25.3 
(1.66)  .36 
Sons  23.2 
(1.5) 
27.9 
(1.21)  .60 
Greece 
Daughters  32.9 
(2.41) 
28.3 
(1.46)  .61 
Sons  2.41 
(.34) 
16.8 
(1.24)  .31 
Spain 
Daughters  2.86 
(.39) 
16.8 
(1.38)  .31 
Sons  1.55 
(.19) 
14.9 
(1.07)  .29 
Portugal 
Daughters  1.49 
(.22) 
10.1 
(1.05)  .25 
Notes: *Standard errors between parenthesis. Regional dummies (NUTS2), educational dummies, and 
years of birth dummies (4 years interval) also included. 
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Table 5: Estimation results of the intergenerational earnings elasticity . By 
country and child gender. 
 ˆ
 
Son-father pairs  Daughter- father pairs 
Country 





































Portugal  .222 
(.056)  796  .243 
(.052)  553 
Notes: Standard errors between parenthesis. Outliers are detected using the Hadi procedure of  
STATA 9 and excluded.  
 




Table A1: Summary statistics of variables used in the selection equation. 
 
Highest level of 
education attained 
Country 
Average monthly gross 
rent per room* 
(standard deviation) 






149.9  .43 .62  .17 
Germany 
(23.8)  (.10) (.48)  (.38) 
1970.5 
(5.9) 
95.5  .74 .39  .46 
Belgium 
(15.4)  (.10) (.48)  (.49) 
1968.7 
(5.4) 
124.9  .63 .35  .36 
France 
(28.6)  (.07) (.47)  (.48) 
1970.7 
(5.4) 
79.2  .78 .55  .10 
Italy 
(21.1)  (.07) (.50)  (.30) 
1969.7 
(5.2) 
83.8  .80 .46  .36 
Greece 
(13.5)  (.09) (.50)  (.48) 
1969.9 
(5.6) 
41.7  .84 .26  .39 
Spain 
(10.6)  (.07) (.44)  (.48) 
1970.5 
(5.6) 
23.7  .72 .23  .13 
Portugal 
(7.2)   (.11)  (.42)  (.34) 
1971.8 
(5.8) 
Notes: *in 2000 prices and in euro. 
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